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Eliot Cohen is a professor of strategic studies at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) who held multiple posts in the George W. Bush administration and is closely tied to the neoconservative advocacy community. Closely affiliated with the circle of hawks who surrounded former Vice President Dick Cheney, Cohen served as counselor to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and sat on the Defense Policy Board during Donald Rumsfeld’s tenure as defense secretary. Cohen is a member of the American Enterprise Institute's council of academic advisors, was a founding signatory of the Project for the New American Century (PNAC), and advised the now-defunct Committee for the Liberation of Iraq.

Cohen’s popularity is not limited to neoconservatives. His work is also promoted by scholars based at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS), a “liberal hawk” think tank with close ties to the Obama administration. [1] Thomas Ricks, a CNAS scholar and former Washington Post correspondent, has lauded Cohen’s work on his Foreignpolicy.com blog, calling him “one of the smartest people I have ever met.” [2] Another CNAS scholar, Andrew Exum, a retired U.S. army soldier who served in Iraq and is a former fellow at the hawkish and Israel-centric Washington Institute for Near East Policy, endorsed Cohen’s work on his Abu Muqawama blog. [3]

Cohen has disparaged the Obama administration’s focus on diplomacy as driven by shallow concerns. In an August 2009 Wall Street Journal op-ed, Cohen wrote: "Even as stubborn facts cause the [Obama] administration to claim many of the same executive privileges (e.g., a proper secrecy about some CIA activities) as its predecessor, and continue or expand the same policies, it suffers from its desire to be un-Bush. Believing (incorrectly) that the Bush administration did not do diplomacy, it does so promiscuously, complete with such tomfoolery as a misspelled reset button given to the Russian foreign minister. Abhorring Bush’s freedom agenda, it will avoid anything of the kind until, of course, being Americans, the president, the vice president or the secretary of state blurt out their faith in universal ideals, and their indignation at the behavior of thugs, dictators and tyrants.” [4]

Cohen gained media attention in the years leading up to the Iraq War when President George W. Bush and many influential administration figures  appeared in public holding Cohen's 2002 book Supreme Command. The book argued that civilian leaders often have more strategic sense than military leaders. James Mann, in his 2004 book Rise of the Vulcans, commented on Bush's purported reading material: "Few recognized the symbolism and subtext of [Bush] carrying Cohen's book, the determination not to let U.S. military leaders play the powerful political role Powell had exerted at the time of America's first war with Iraq. Cheney and [Paul] Wolfowitz certainly understood." [5]

MacKubin Owens, a scholar at the conservative Ashbrook Center for Public Affairs, wrote: "As Cohen pointed out in his indispensable book Supreme Command, the normal theory of civil-military relations has rarely held. … The fact remains that wars are not fought for their own purposes but to achieve policy goals set by the political leadership of the state. And so it is with President Bush and Iraq. He has outlined his plan and chosen the generals he believes can implement it." [6]

By 2005, however, Cohen seemed less confident in civilian leaders' ability to manage a war. In a 2005 Washington Post op-ed titled "A Hawk Questions Himself as His Son Goes to War," Cohen argued that although the decision to invade Iraq was correct, "what I did not know then that I do know now is just how incompetent we would be at carrying out that task." [7]

At Johns Hopkins' SAIS, a beltway institute that has been a base for numerous prominent neoconservatives like Paul Wolfowitz and Gary Schmitt, Cohen heads the Center for Strategic Studies, a program founded in 2003 with a generous grant from Philip Merrill, the now-deceased banker, minor media mogul, and advisor to the hawkish Center for Security Policy (CSP). [8]

In 2001, Cohen was one of a host of hardliners given seats on the Pentagon's Defense Policy Board (DPB), which at the time was chaired by Richard Perle, a key supporter of the Iraq War based at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI). (Others with the DPB at the time included James Woolsey, Newt Gingrich, and Richard Allen.) Shortly after the 9/11 attacks, Cohen was part of a core group of neoconservatives who pushed the idea that Iraq should be a primary target in the war on terror—despite any actual connection between Iraq and the 9/11 terrorists. A founding member of the Project for the New American Century (PNAC), Cohen contributed his name to PNAC's notorious September 20, 2001 letter to President Bush, which argued that even if Saddam Hussein was not connected to the terrorist attacks, "any strategy aiming at the eradication of terrorism and its sponsors must include a determined effort to remove Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq."

In a Wall Street Journal editorial a few weeks after 9/11, Cohen provocatively proposed the idea that the war on terror is World War IV. Other prominent neoconservatives—including former Commentary editor Norman Podhoretz, DPB member (and former CIA director) James Woolsey, and CSP's Frank Gaffney—quickly adopted the term World War IV in their writings. [9]

In his Journal op-ed, Cohen considered several potential names for the war that began, he argued, "well before Sept. 11." After dismissing the "9/11 War" and the "Afghan War," Cohen proposed: "A less palatable but more accurate name is World War IV. The Cold War was World War III, which reminds us that not all global conflicts entail the movement of multimillion-man armies, or conventional front lines on a map. The analogy with the Cold War does, however, suggest some key features of that conflict: that it is, in fact, global; that it will involve a mixture of violent and nonviolent efforts; that it will require mobilization of skill, expertise, and resources, if not of vast numbers of soldiers; that it may go on for a long time; and that it has ideological roots." [10]

Arguing that the invasion of Afghanistan was merely "one front" in this war, Cohen set out an ambitious agenda based on some hyperbolic assertions, including the false claim that Saddam Hussein supported Al Qaeda. Among Cohen's proposals: Pushing "free and moderate governance in the Muslim world," especially in Iran, arguing that the "overthrow of the first theocratic revolutionary Muslim state and its replacement by a moderate or secular government ... would be no less important a victory in this war than the annihilation of [Osama] bin Laden"; targeting all regimes that sponsor terrorists, with Iraq being "an obvious candidate, having not only helped al-Qaida, but attacked Americans directly (including an assassination attempt against the first President Bush) and developed weapons of mass destruction"; and finally, mobilizing the U.S. public "in earnest" for The Long War. [11]

In late 2006, with the Iraq War turning sour and conservative "realists" making a comeback in the form of the Iraq Study Group (ISG) led by former Secretary of State James Baker and former Rep. Lee Hamilton (D-IN), Cohen expressed growing frustration with the way the Bush administration was waging the war on terror. [12] In early 2007 then-Secretary of State Rice echoed the ISG's call for a "diplomatic offensive" toward Iran and North Korea. ISoon after the ISG released its final report, Cohen criticized the group in a Wall Street Journal editorial: "This is a group composed, for the most part, of retired eminent public officials, most with limited or no expertise in the waging or study of war. It consists of individuals carefully selected with an eye to diverse partisan and other irrelevant personal characteristics. These worthies, with not one chairman but two (for balance, of course), turned to several score experts known to disagree vehemently with one another about the best course of action to be pursued in Iraq." [13]

Cohen concluded: "The creation of the Iraq Study Group reflects the vain hope that well-meaning, senior, former public officials can find ideas that have not already occurred to people inside government; that those new ideas can redeem incompetent execution and insufficient resources. ... This is no way to run a war, and most definitely, no way to win it." [14]

Despite his differences with the State Department, particularly with Rice, in 2007 Cohen was asked to serve as Rice’s counselor. Cohen's appointment came as surprise to many observers because it came on the heels of several of Rice's diplomatic overtures in hotspots like North Korea and Iran. "Condi may feel she needs to have a neocon right next to her to protect her flanks," surmised Chris Nelson, editor of the Washington insider newsletter the Nelson Report. "And, if she's really planning to put her foot down on the Israelis, which [Washington] will have to do if it wants to get a real process with the Palestinians under way as part of a bigger regional deal with the Saudis and Iranians, then a guy like Cohen up there on the [State Department's] seventh floor who is in on it and can claim influence on the outcome can help." [15]

In 2001 Cohen co-edited War Over Kosovo, a compendium of writings about the Balkan conflict. His coeditor was Andrew Bacevich, a critic of neoconservative influence on U.S. policymaking who later wrote The New American Militarism (2005).  Reviewing the Kosovo book for Foreign Affairs, Stephen Biddle observed that Bacevich and Cohen see the conflict as marking the emergence of a fundamentally new "American way of war." According to Biddle, the authors consider the United States particularly suited to "crusades to end fascism or save democracy," but not suited "to the dirty work of imperial policing to secure second- or third-tier interests." Thus, to get public support for intervening in places like Kosovo, the Clinton administration decided to do it "on the cheap"  through such tactics as air campaigns that minimize American casualties.

Biddle's review appeared just as the administration began building its case for invading Iraq. President Bush, he concluded, "casts a new war in similar terms yet draws back from asking Americans to make any major sacrifices to wage it. If U.S. aims prove achievable without pain, then the Bush administration will deserve the highest praise from a grateful nation and will be able to justly claim mastery of a new way of war that all should acclaim. If not, however, then one can be forgiven for wondering whether the style of warfare waged in Kosovo has not outlived its usefulness." [16]