Right Web

Please note: IPS Right Web neither represents nor endorses any of the individuals or groups profiled on this site.

Thomas Donnelly, a fellow at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) and a former deputy director of the now-defunct Project for the New American Century (PNAC), writes frequently on defense and security issues and has been one of the key neoconservative promoters of a long-term U.S. military engagement in Iraq. A constant theme of his work is what he regards as the dangerous gap between U.S. global military responsibilities and the country's abilities to fulfill them. In his 2005 book, The Military We Need: The Defense Requirements of the Bush Doctrine, Donnelly argues that the U.S. military needs to be upgraded and expanded to meet the "strategic and military realities of our post-September 11 world." According to Donnelly, "The gap between America's strategic reach and its military grasp has reached a point of crisis" (see The Military We Need: The Defense Requirements of the Bush Doctrine, AEI Press, 2005).

According to Donnelly, closing the gap is "inherent to the preservation of America's position as a global superpower and the great-power peace and broadening prosperity that has marked the post-Cold War era," as he wrote in The Military We Need. For Donnelly, U.S. national security strategy must extend beyond the "war against radical Islamist networks" to an "extended commitment to reshape the region's political order in a liberal and democratic fashion. Thus, American security strategy requires more than containment or even a 'rollback' of enemies in the greater Middle East; it demands that we establish something more lasting in partnership with local allies. The job for our forces is to create the opportunity for these more representative, liberal, and ultimately stable governments to take root." With respect to Iraq, this means not only staying until there is a "return of sovereignty, democratic elections, and a modicum of security." Even if the United States successfully achieves these goals, "it will remain obligated to help a free Iraq defend itself in a hostile region." He warns that U.S. withdrawal is not possible: "There is a substantial 'defer forward' mission that looms after the 'win decisively' is done. And what is true in Iraq is also true on a smaller scale in Afghanistan."

Donnelly has argued since 9/11 that the greatest threat facing America and the world is what he terms "revolutionary Islam." In a September 2007 article for Bill Kristol's Weekly Standard, Donnelly wrote: "For better or worse, it is and will be for quite a while the duty of America's land forces to fight the Long War. Of the three great security challenges of our time—the rise of China, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and the dangers of revolutionary Islam—it is the third that requires of us strong land power capabilities. The way to manage the risks of this extended struggle is to rebuild and reshape our land forces to respond to the challenge. While not all the battles of this war will be exactly like Iraq, the bitter experience of the last four years should serve as a reminder that we must adapt to the war as it is rather than pretend we have the option of fighting a war we would prefer. Nor should we pretend that there's something more important for U.S. ground troops to do. If they are ordered to retreat from this battle, their next battle is likely to be a lot harder."

In 2006, Donnelly critiqued the Pentagon's 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review for the Armed Forces Journal (where he was once editor), in which he wrote: "Heading into the 2005 QDR, the Pentagon found itself with an irresolvable dilemma. The goal of American pre-eminence endured—indeed President Bush's 2002 national security strategy had strengthened the commitment—but the hopes for preserving Pax Americana on the cheap, the hopes of every U.S. administration since the end of the Cold War, had been shattered by new strategic realities. Not only was there the matter of the Middle East, but China's rising military had learned the lessons of the revolution in military affairs to create new power-projection capabilities that put U.S. forces at risk in the event of a crisis or conflict. And there was the even-more-difficult challenge of what to do about the spread of nuclear weapons to unstable and rogue-type regimes such as Iran" (Armed Forces Journal, February 1, 2006).

Donnelly concluded his critique of the QDR, stating: "It's time to stop thinking and start spending. Only a larger and more capable force—a more expensive force—can give us the strategic options we so desperately need."

With respect to Iran, Donnelly contributed an essay called "Strategy for a Nuclear Iran," to an October 2005 book titled Getting Ready for a Nuclear-Ready Iran, which was edited by Patrick Clawson (of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy) and Henry Sokolski. A "nuclear Iran," wrote Donnelly, represents a security threat not so much because it would use the weapons or pass them on to terrorists, but rather because of "the constraining effect it threatens to impose upon U.S. strategy for the greater Middle East." Donnelly proposed a restrained military solution to an Iranian nuclear problem: "[t]he difficulties of even limited military strikes [against Iran] are too little appreciated. While a full discussion of the operational realities is beyond the scope of this chapter, some hard truths are worth mentioning. Iran is large, populous, rugged, and its nuclear facilities are spread throughout the country. Its nuclear program probably cannot be crippled in a single, surgical strike, as was Iraq's in Israel's famous Osiraq raid. ... The military approach that perhaps best balances risks and rewards might be a comprehensive air campaign, lasting perhaps a week, to be followed by fomenting an Afghanistan-style insurgency."

In the forward to Rebuilding America's Defenses, Donnelly and other PNAC analysts explained that their strategic vision "builds upon the defense strategy outlined by the [Dick] Cheney Defense Department in the waning days of the Bush [Sr.] administration." This PNAC document on military transformation credits the draft 1992 Defense Planning Guidance paper with providing "a blueprint for maintaining U.S. preeminence, precluding the rise of a great-power rival, and shaping the international security order in line with American principles and interests."

According to the PNAC report: "The American peace has proven itself peaceful, stable, and durable. Yet no moment in international politics can be frozen in time: even a global Pax Americana will not preserve itself." To preserve this "American peace" through the 21st century, the PNAC narrative concludes that the global order "must have a secure foundation on unquestioned U.S. military preeminence." Donnelly, the document's principal author and PNAC's deputy director at the time, expressed the hope that "the project's report will be useful as a road map for the nation's immediate and future defense plans." Donald Kagan and Gary Schmitt were co-chairs for the report, and project participants included Eliot Cohen, Robert Kagan, I. Lewis Libby, Abram Shulsky, Daniel Goure and Dov Zakheim.

Donnelly started his career at The Journal newspapers in the Washington, DC suburbs, leaving for a position at Army Times in 1980. According to the National Defense University's bio of Donnelly: "In 1985 he helped launch Defense News, becoming the paper's deputy editor, the number two position, in 1987. ... In 1994 he became executive editor of the National Interest. In 1995, he joined the professional staff of the House Committee on Armed Services and soon was named head of the policy group. His major contributions to the committee's work included overseeing committee activities concerning the operations of U.S. forces in the Balkans, leading the committee's investigation of the Khobar Towers bombing in Saudi Arabia and worldwide readiness problems, and establishing a series of hearings and committee white papers on American security interests in the post-Cold War world. In addition, Donnelly drafted significant legislative initiatives to reform the Defense Department's readiness reporting system, explore the promise of the current revolution in military affairs, monitor developments in the Chinese military, understand the military and strategic effects of an expanded NATO alliance, and shape the requirements for the 1997 and 2001 Quadrennial Defense Reviews."

Donnelly is president of Strategic Education Associates, a consulting firm owned by Eliot Cohen, and joined the Center for Strategic and International Studies in 2006 as a senior fellow.

Before joining AEI, Donnelly was the director in 2002 of strategic communications and initiatives at Lockheed Martin, one of the country's largest military contractors. From 1999 through 2002, Donnelly was PNAC's deputy executive director. After stepping down as PNAC's deputy director, Donnelly remained at PNAC as a military analyst (see Thomas Donnelly Biography page, Project for the New American Century).

Donnelly is the author of AEI's policy journal National Security Outlook. He has also written or co-authored several books, including: Iraqi Freedom (2004), Operation Just Cause: The Storming of Panama (1991), and Clash of Chariots: A History of Armored Warfare (1996). His latest major publication is Of Men and Materiel: The Crisis in Military Resources, a 2007 AEI volume edited with Schmitt, a cofounder of PNAC and colleague at AEI. Like a number of other recent neoconservative-authored works, including by Joshua Muravchik and Frederick Kagan, Of Men and Materiel argues that the U.S. military is suffering grave deficiencies in meeting America's strategic needs due in part to efforts by Pentagon reformers like Donald Rumsfeld to focus on modernization at the expense of properly funding materiel replacement and building up the size of the standing forces. The book calls for massive increases in defense spending, and its various essays call for boosting the capacities of each branch of the services and reforming procurement procedures. In the book's introduction, Schmitt and Donnelly write: "As a country, we should ... recognize that an under-funded and undermanned military is a far more urgent issue than the failure to turn the Pentagon into a model of hyperefficiency and paradigm-breaking military thinking. The latter is a problem; the former is a recipe for defeat."

Please note: IPS Right Web neither represents nor endorses any of the individuals or groups profiled on this site.